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Islamic marriages in South Africa: Quo vadimus? 
Due to their potentially polygamous nature, Islamic marriages are not 
recognised in terms of South African law. The consequences of this 
non-recognition have been particularly unfair to Muslim women. Until 
2000 a Muslim woman had no claim for loss of support if her husband 
was unlawfully killed. Even today she cannot claim maintenance from 
her husband after a divorce; she is not an intestate beneficiary after 
the death of her husband; can be compelled to give evidence against 
her husband in criminal proceedings and can not claim financial 
support during the course of her marriage. Since early times there 
have been calls for the recognition of Islamic marriages. The 1996 
Constitution of South Africa protects, among other rights, cultural and 
religious rights and makes provision for the recognition of cultural and 
religious marriages by means of legislation. This article gives a brief 
historical overview regarding the position of Islamic marriages in 
South Africa. Thereafter the current position of Islamic marriages will 
be discussed, and finally a few comments regarding the future of 
Islamic marriages will be given. 
Opsomming 
Islamitiese huwelike in Suid-Afrika: Quo vadimus? 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse reg ontken die geldigheid van Islamitiese 
huwelike as gevolg van die potensieel poligamiese aard daarvan. Die 
gevolge van dié nie-erkenning is besonder nadelig vir Moslemvroue. 
                                           
1 Revised paper delivered at the Workshop on “Women in Church and Society” 
held at Potchefstroom, 6-8 May 2002. 
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Tot en met 2000 kon sy nie onderhoud eis indien haar man 
onregmatig gedood is nie. Selfs vandag kan sy geen onderhoud van 
haar man na ’n egskeiding eis nie. Verder is sy nie ’n intestate 
erfgenaam na die dood van haar man nie; sy kan gedwing word om 
getuienis teen haar man in ’n kriminele saak af te lê en sy kan nie 
finansiële ondersteuning tydens haar huwelik eis nie. Sedert die 
vroegste tye was daar eise vir die erkenning van Islamitiese huwelike 
in Suid-Afrika. Die 1996 Grondwet beskerm onder andere kulturele en 
godsdienstige regte en maak voorsiening vir die erkenning van 
kulturele en godsdienstige huwelike by wyse van wetgewing. In 
hierdie artikel word ’n breë oorsig oor die geskiedenis met betrekking 
tot die erkenning van Islamitiese huwelike in Suid-Afrika gegee. 
Daarna word die huidige posisie bespreek en laastens word enkele 
opmerkings aangaande die toekoms van Islamitiese huwelike 
gemaak. 
1. Introductory remarks 
South Africa has been described as a “rainbow nation”. Its populat-
ion comprises a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multireligious society. 
The great majority of South Africans are Christians, although from 
various affiliations. Other religious minorities are also present: 
Muslims and Hindus (for example) constitute about two percent 
respectively and Jews less than half a percent of the total 
population. Adherents to Muslim, Hindu and Jewish religious legal 
systems live, to a large extent, according to unrecognised customs 
and practices. The rest of the so-called Western population is 
subject to the (mainly) secular laws of South Africa.  
Since early times there have been calls for the recognition of certain 
aspects of religious legal systems and, in particular, for the 
recognition of Islamic marriages.2 The non-recognition of Islamic 
marriages was and still is a contentious issue in South Africa. Due to 
their potentially polygamous nature, Islamic marriages are not 
recognised as valid in terms of South African law.3 The tradition of 
                                           
2 The attempts of the Muslim community to seek legal recognition of aspects of 
Islamic personal law finally led to the establishment of a Project Committee of 
the South African Law Commission in respect of its investigation into Islamic 
marriages and related matters. See South African Law Commission Islamic 
Marriages and Related Matters (Project 59). Up to date two discussion 
documents have been issued for comments, namely Issue Paper 15 and 
Discussion Paper 101. 
3 Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). South African law is commonly referred to 
as South African common law. The development of South African common law, 
as the official legal system of South Africa is very interesting. In short its 
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monogamous marriages, regarded as lawful in terms of Roman-
Dutch law (referred to as civil marriages), and that was regarded as 
norm in South Africa since the time of the first Dutch settlers is, in 
general, the only marriages recognised as valid marriages.4 This 
kind of marriage was and is still open to members of all the different 
population groups in South Africa.5 Hahlo (1985:29) describes a 
marriage as “… the legally recognized voluntary union for life in 
common of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others 
while it lasts”.  
In this definition lies the first and most important reason for the non-
recognition of Islamic marriages in South Africa. Islamic marriages 
are not monogamous, but either de facto polygamous or potentially 
polygamous. According to South African common law, these 
marriages are contra bonos mores and therefore void.6 For an 
Islamic marriage to be recognised, it has to comply with the 
                                                                                                                           
development started with the establishment of a refreshment station by the 
Dutch East India Company (known as the “VOC”) in 1652. As a natural result of 
the Dutch colonisation of the Cape the laws applicable to the settlers in the 
Cape were those outlined by Roman-Dutch law. These laws were official in the 
Netherlands at that stage. Roman-Dutch law applicable in the Cape started, 
however, to expand and develop in a different direction than Roman-Dutch law 
practices in the Netherlands. English law also influenced it after the British 
occupation in 1806. The influence was primarily in the form of legislation and 
court decisions. Today South African common law is a conglomerate of Roman-
Dutch law, English law and legislation. For a further discussion of the history of 
South African common law, see Kleyn and Viljoen (2002: chapter 2). 
4 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, which came into 
effect on 15 November 2000, gives recognition to polygamous customary 
marriages. Despite section 15(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 108 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the 1996 Constitution) similar 
legislation has not been issued for the recognition of religious marriages. 
5 The law of marriage in South Africa is a conglomerate of Roman-Dutch law and 
legislation. The legal requirements for a valid marriage according to Roman-
Dutch law concern the contractual capacity of the spouses, consensus between 
the spouses and a lawful marriage. See Cronjé and Heaton (1999:21-47) for the 
requirements of a valid marriage. Furthermore, certain formalities as prescribed 
in the Marriage Act must be complied with. These formalities include, inter alia, 
the solemnisation of the marriage by a competent marriage officer in terms of 
section 11(1), the producing of identity documents and/or sworn affidavits by the 
parties in terms of section 12, the following of certain procedures at the marriage 
ceremony in terms of section 29 and the registration of the marriage in terms of 
section 29A. See Clark (1989:159-212) for a detailed discussion on the history 
of marriage in South Africa. 
6 Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 
SA 1006 (A). 
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provisions of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961.7 The impediment against 
Islamic marriages does not only affect Islamic marriages contracted 
in South Africa, but also those contracted abroad.8  
On 27 April 1994, South Africa entered a new constitutional 
dispensation with the commencement of the 1993 Constitution.9 The 
1993 Constitution was repealed by the 1996 Constitution, which 
commenced on 4 February 1997. The 1996 Constitution recognises 
freedom of religion and makes provision for the recognition of 
religious and traditional marriages by means of legislation.10  
The 1996 Constitution also recognises the religious diversity of the 
South African population and opens the door for the future 
recognition of Islamic marriages.11 It is clear from these provisions 
that Muslim people have the right to enjoy their culture and to 
practise their religion. The right to have Islamic marriages12 
recognised is, however, not constitutionalised in the 1996 Con-
stitution.13  
                                           
7 Hereafter referred to as the Marriage Act. For example, in terms of section 11 of 
the Act a marriage must be solemnised by an appointed marriage officer. If the 
Imam is not an appointed marriage officer, he would not be in a position to 
solemnise a valid marriage in terms of the Act. Such a person may, however, 
receive an appointment as a marriage officer. See Sinclair (1996:263-266). 
8 Thus an Islamic marriage concluded as a valid marriage in Pakistan between 
two Pakistanis will not be recognised as a valid marriage in South Africa. The 
non-recognition of Islamic marriages contracted abroad has various implications 
for Muslims who live in South Africa. Their marriages are not recognised and 
therefore the normal legal effects of such marriages are also not recognised. 
9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as 
the 1993 Constitution). 
10 Freedom of religion was recognised in terms of section 14 of the 1993 
Constitution. 
11 Section 15 (freedom of religion, belief and opinion), read with sections 30 (right 
to language and culture), 31 (rights of cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities), 181(1)(c) (establishment of the Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities) and 185 
(objects and functions of the Commission). 
12 There has been constant pressure on the Government to recognise Islamic 
personal law. See Moosa (1996:41 et seq). Islamic personal law includes the 
marriage and succession laws of Muslims. 
13 The position was the same under the 1993 Constitution. See De Waal, Currie 
and Erasmus (2001:308).  
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Furthermore, certain provisions of the 1996 Constitution seem 
fraught with potential conflict.14 For example, according to the 
Islamic law of divorce, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife by 
uttering the word talaaq three times. The same option is, however, 
not available to a Muslim wife. This Islamic law seems to be in direct 
conflict with the right to equality. However, it may be argued by 
some that such discrimination is sanctioned in terms of the 
provisions that recognise religious and cultural rights so that such 
discrimination is consequently not unconstitutional.15  
This article may be divided broadly into three sections. Firstly, a brief 
historical overview regarding the recognition of Islamic marriages in 
South Africa will be given (see § 2). Thereafter, the current position 
regarding Islamic marriages will be discussed (see § 3). Finally, a 
few concluding remarks regarding the future of Islamic marriages in 
the light of the 1996 Constitution and the proposals of the South 
African Law Commission will be given (see § 4 and 5).  
2. Historical background 
The majority of Muslims who first arrived in the former Cape Colony 
was brought from Dutch colonies in the East Indies (now Indonesia), 
the coastal regions of Southern India and Malaysia as slaves, 
convicts and political exiles. Later they were also imported from 
India to work on the sugar plantations of the former Natal Province 
(later renamed KwaZulu-Natal) and some of them also came as 
                                           
14 See sections 15, 30, 31, 181(1)(c), 185, 187 and 9. Section 9 is referred to as 
the equality-clause. Section 9(1) confirms that every individual “is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. Section 9(2) 
deals with measures to effect so-called “affirmative action”. Section 9(3) 
prohibits unfair discrimination by the State on the grounds of race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. Section 9(4) 
prohibits unfair discrimination between individuals on the same grounds and 
authorises the national legislature to enact legislation to prohibit unfair 
discrimination. In terms of section 9(5) discrimination in terms of subsection (3) 
is unfair unless it is proven that the particular discrimination is fair. The onus is 
thus on the person/state who alleges that the discrimination is fair. 
15 According to Goolam (1996:752-753), cognisance must be taken of the different 
value systems of the various communities before human rights issues are 
debated. He argues: “In order to understand the approach adopted by any 
particular culture or civilisation in respect of the issue of gender equality, it is 
necessary to understand the culture’s or civilisation’s total approach to human 
existence. In this way, a solution to a specific problem is correctly viewed in its 
larger and complete setting.” 
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businessmen. Although the Dutch colonials prohibited the practice of 
Islam in public places or the conversions of heathens or Christians 
to Islam, the English colonials gave them religious freedom in 
1806.16 
Although religious freedom has existed in South Africa from an early 
stage, it did not mean that de facto or potentially polygamous 
religious marriages were recognised as valid marriages. From an 
early stage and as a general rule these marriages were regarded as 
contra bonos mores and thus void. The consequence was that the 
wife of such a union was not recognised as a “wife” in terms of 
South African law and the children born out of such a union were 
regarded as extra-marital.17   
Due to the large influx of Indian immigrants of whom a large section 
was Muslims, some of the provinces made provision for different 
marriage and immigration laws regarding Indians.18 However, these 
marriages had to be monogamous before they could receive 
                                           
16 Much has been written about the settlement of Muslims in South Africa. For a 
brief summary see Moosa (1996:35 et seq). 
17 Bronn v Frits Bronn’s Executors (1860) 3 Searle 313; R v Sukina 1912 TPD 
1079; Esop v Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1913 CPD 133. In the 
former Transvaal in R v Fatima 1912 TPD 59 the court held that “wife” included 
the wife of an Indian immigrant who was married in terms of religious rites that 
were not recognised as a valid marriage in terms of the laws of Transvaal. 
“Wife” was, however, restricted to only one wife of an Indian immigrant. In terms 
of section 1 of the Births and Deaths Registration Amendment Act 40 of 1996, 
the children born from such an invalid marriage are no longer regarded as 
extra-marital. Although section 2 of the same Act defines “marriage” as to 
include a religious marriage, it does not give recognition to Islamic marriages. 
18 For example, in the former Cape Colony section 4 of the Marriage Act 16 of 
1860 (C) made provision for marriage officers to be appointed to solemnise 
monogamous Islamic marriages. See Mashia Ebrahim v Mahomed Essop 1905 
TS 59. The particular Act was repealed by the Marriage Act. In terms of section 
4(e) of the Immigration Act 30 of 1906 (C) provision was also made for the 
exemption of the wife of an exempted Indian immigrant. In Esop v Union 
Government (Minister of the Interior) 1913 CPD 133 the court held that “wife” in 
terms of the said Act did not include a woman married in terms of Islamic law 
that recognises polygamy. The particular Act was repealed by the Immigrants 
Regulation Act 22 of 1913. In the former Natal the marriages of Muslims were 
regulated in terms of Law 19 of 1881 (N). The Indian Immigration Law 25 of 
1891 (N) made provision for the registration of the marriages of Indian 
immigrants. These two acts were both repealed by the Marriage Act. No 
provision was made in the former Transvaal and Orange Free State for the 
regulation of Islamic marriages. For a detailed historical discussion of the 
various legislation applicable to marriages in South Africa see an earlier edition 
of Hahlo (1963:16 et seq, 62 fn 2, 583-585). 
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recognition. The only province that made provision for the 
recognition of polygamous Indian marriages was the former province 
of Natal.19 Such recognition was only given to Indian marriages 
concluded before arrival in South Africa. These marriages became 
valid upon registering them by the then Protector of Indian 
Immigrants. Indian immigrants domiciled in South Africa could not 
conclude valid polygamous marriages in South Africa or anywhere 
else after they had established their domicile in South Africa.20  
The Immigrants Regulation Act 22 of 191321 consolidated and 
amended the various immigration laws that existed in the 
provinces.22 The main purpose of the Act was to regulate the affairs 
of immigrants. It made provision for certain persons or classes of 
persons to be exempted as prohibited immigrants. In terms of the 
Act a wife of an immigrant who was in a “lawful and monogamous 
marriage duly celebrated according to the rites of any religious faith 
outside the Union” was also exempted as a prohibited immigrant 
(see section 5(g)). The effect of this provision was very harsh on 
Indian immigrants who were married in terms of Islamic law, 
because such a marriage was not necessarily “lawful and 
monogamous”.  
In 1914 the Indian Relief Act 22 of 1914 brought some respite. The 
reference to a “lawful and monogamous marriage duly celebrated 
according to the rites of any religious faith outside the Union” was 
deleted (see section 3(1)). “Wife” was defined so as to include one 
wife of a polygamous marriage.23 It made provision for the 
                                           
19 Section 68 of the Indian Immigration Law 25 of 1891 (N) as repealed by the 
Marriage Act. 
20 Section 66 of the Indian Immigration Law 25 of 1891 (N) as repealed by the 
Marriage Act. 
21 It commenced on 1 August 1913. In terms of section 5 of the Admission of 
Persons to the Union Regulation Amendment Act 60 of 1961 the title of this Act 
was changed to the Admission of Persons to the Union Regulation Act 22 of 
1913. The Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 59 of 1972 
repealed this act, which was in turn repealed by the Aliens Control Act 96 of 
1991. 
22 See section 29 read with the first schedule of the Act for the laws that were 
repealed. 
23 See section 3(2). The marriage had to be recognised as a valid marriage under 
the tenets of an Indian religion. “Wife” included, however, only any one woman 
to whom the exempted male was married (Hahlo, 1963:585). 
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appointment of priests of any Indian religion as marriage officers. 
They were authorised to conclude Indian marriages according to the 
rites of any Indian religion (see section 1). Such a marriage could be 
transformed into a valid marriage if it was registered (see section 2). 
In order to be registered, the marriage had to be recognised as a 
marriage under the tenets of the particular religion and had to be a 
de facto monogamous marriage. However, the incidents that 
followed from such a marriage were identical to the incidents that 
followed from a valid civil marriage (see section 1(2)). The General 
Law Amendment Act 80 of 1971 repealed the Indian Relief Act and, 
since 1971, it is no longer possible to conclude a valid Indian 
marriage in this way.  
Furthermore, foreign polygamous marriages were and still are not 
recognised as valid marriages in South Africa. The locus classicus in 
this regard is Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 
302. The facts of this case may be summarised as follows: H 
married W1 in 1883 while domiciled in India. Three children were 
born in India out of this marriage. In 1902 he immigrated to South 
Africa and settled in the former Province of Natal. In 1904, while 
domiciled in Natal, he went back to India and married W2. Six 
children were born out of his second marriage, two in India and four 
in Natal. H died leaving a will in which he bequeathed his estate to 
his two wives and all his children according to Islamic law. Under the 
Natal Act 35 of 1905 the “lineal descendants” of the testator must 
pay 1% estate tax and all other beneficiaries 5%. The “surviving 
spouse” of the testator was exempt from paying estate tax. It was, 
therefore, essential to determine whether H’s wives were “surviving 
spouses” and his children “lineal descendants” in terms of the Act. It 
was accepted that H’s second marriage was void and his children 
therefore extra-marital. He was domiciled in Natal and could, 
therefore, not have concluded a valid polygamous marriage in India. 
However, regarding H’s first marriage it was argued that such a 
marriage was valid in terms of the law of domicile (that was India) 
and should, therefore, also be recognised as a valid marriage in 
terms of South African law. The court found that it is under no 
obligation to recognise a marriage contracted validly in terms of 
foreign law if such a marriage would be “repugnant to the moral 
principles of its people” (at 307).  
The court held that polygamy … vitally affects the nature of the 
most important relationship into which human beings can enter. It 
is reprobated by the majority of civilized peoples, on grounds of 
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morality and religion24, and the Courts of a country which forbids it 
are not justified in recognizing a polygamous union as a valid 
marriage.25  
The court held that W1 was not a “surviving spouse” in terms of the 
said Act and that she had to pay 5% estate tax. However, since the 
status of their children was determined in terms of domicile of 
religion, they were legitimate in India and, therefore, also in South 
Africa. The children of H and W1 were “lineal descendants” in terms 
of the said Act and only liable to pay 1% estate tax. 
On 1 January 1962, the Marriage Act came into operation. It is a 
consolidation of all existing marriage laws and some immigration 
laws in South Africa. “Marriage” is not defined in terms of the Act 
and it is generally accepted that it means a civil marriage. The Act 
makes provision for the appointment of a marriage officer with 
authority to solemnise a marriage “according to Christian, Jewish or 
Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion” (at 307-308).26 
Section 29A further makes provision for the registration of such a 
marriage by the marriage officer. Islamic marriages will, therefore, 
be regarded as valid monogamous marriages if they were 
solemnised by an authorised marriage officer and if the particular 
marriage was registered (Hahlo, 1985:31-32).27 The Marriage Act 
makes it possible for a void de facto monogamous Islamic marriage 
to be converted into a valid civil marriage. The conversion means, 
however, that South African common law applies to such a marriage 
and it is, therefore, unacceptable to most Muslims. 
                                           
24 Own emphasis. Sixty six years later the court in Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 
(A) 1026A-B concurred with this judgement. However, the court in the Ismail 
case did not say that an Islamic marriage was contra bonos mores in a narrow 
sense, that is, immoral, but held that such a union is contra bonos mores in a 
wider sense, that is “contrary to the accepted customs and usages which are 
regarded as morally binding upon all members of our society … or ‘as being 
fundamentally opposed to our principles and institutions’”. This is a clear shift in 
the court’s attitude towards the reason given for the invalidity of a polygamous 
marriage. The reason shifted from being regarded as unchristian to it being 
regarded against accepted customs and usages. 
25 It is irrelevant if such a marriage is de facto monogamous or not. 
26 See section 3. It has been found that the clause “according to Christian, Jewish 
or Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion” does not authorise the 
conclusion of potentially polygamous unions in terms of Islamic law. See Ismail 
v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A) 1021A-C. 
27 The Act also prescribes other formalities for valid marriages. 
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3. Islamic marriages today 
Although Muslims constitute only about 2% of the total population of 
South Africa,28 they regard adherence to their religion in a very 
serious light. In general Muslims feel that they have the right to 
regulate their lives in terms of their own legal system, that is Islamic 
personal law (Moosa, 1995:19-22). This means that Muslims also 
seek recognition of their marriages and the consequences flowing 
therefrom. However, legislature and the attitude of courts have not 
been sympathetic towards this plight of Muslims in South Africa 
since the commencement of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions. 
These constitutions still do not recognise Islamic marriages as valid 
marriages.  
Courts did, in some cases, declare Islamic marriages as putative 
marriages.29 However, in order to be declared a putative marriage, it 
must be proved that one or both of the parties acted in good faith. 
Although an Islamic marriage is regarded as void, it has certain of 
the effects of a valid marriage. For example, the children of a 
putative marriage have the same status as the children born from a 
valid civil marriage (Hahlo, 1985:111-117). 
In 1983 the court of appeal interpreted the provisions of the 
Marriage Act in Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). The facts of the 
case may be summarised as follows: H and W were married in 
terms of Islamic law. Their marriage was at all material times 
monogamous. Approximately four years after their marriage H 
divorced W by means of talaaqi.30 W claimed for arrear 
maintenance31, the delivery of deferred dowry, payment of certain 
                                           
28 In 1991 there were 389 573 Hindus, 338 142 Muslims and 67 654 Jews from a 
population of 30 986 920 people in South Africa. See Central Statistical Services 
Report 03/01/22 – Population Census 1991. There are also other statistics 
available that differ somewhat from the statistics of the Central Statistical 
Services. The difference is, however, of no great importance. See Moosa 
(1996:39-40); Haron (1997:1). 
29 See, inter alia, Moola v Aulsebrook No 1983 1 SA 687 (N); Ex Parte Azar 1932 
OPD 107; Ex Parte L 1947 3 SA 50 (C). However, in Solomons v Abrams 1991 
4 SA 437 (W) the court refused to declare a Islamic marriage as a putative 
marriage. The court held that only a ceremony that has been duly solemnised in 
terms of the Marriage Act could be regarded as a valid marriage. 
30 If the talaaqi (meaning “I divorce you”) is communicated three times at certain 
stages by a husband to a wife the marriages comes to an end. 
31 She alleged that H did not maintain her during the last two years and ten months 
of their marriage. 
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jewellery in W’s possession and maintenance for the period of 
Iddat32 in the Moulana33. The Moulana gave judgement in favour of 
W. H neglected to abide by the judgement and W instituted action in 
the Transvaal Provincial Division. H raised a point in limine against 
her particulars of action:  
[i]nasmuch as the customs relied upon by the plaintiff [W] are 
contra bonos mores, unreasonable and in conflict with law, 
alternatively are in conflict with rules of law which are unalterable 
by agreement (at 1019E-F). 
The exception was upheld in the court a quo and it was found that 
the marriage was polygamous and, therefore, void on the grounds of 
public policy. The court argued that to “… entertain the plaintiff’s 
[W’s] claims would be tantamount to recognising the illegal union 
entered into by the parties and that would be to fly into the face of all 
authority in this country … (at 1019F-G) ”. 
W lodged an appeal against this decision. The Appellate Division 
had to decide whether the court a quo erred in upholding the point in 
limine of H. In order to do so, the validity of the marriage between H 
and W had to be investigated. 
W’s counsel agreed that the marriage was not valid because it is 
potentially polygamous and did not comply with the formalities of the 
Marriage Act (see sections 2, 3, 11 & 29(2) of the Act).34 They 
argued that W’s cause of action was based on certain Islamic 
customs and a marriage contract and not on the marriage between 
the parties. The question that had to be considered was whether the 
Islamic customs and a contract arising from them are contra bonos 
mores and not whether the marriage was valid or void. The court did 
not agree with this approach and thus stated: 
In my view the claims should not be viewed in isolation. The tenets 
of the Muslim faith appear to govern all aspects of the marriage 
relationship. … the Court must have regard to the very close and 
intimate connection between the customs and contract in question 
and the underlying conjugal union (1020D-F). 
                                           
32 Iddat refers to a waiting period that starts after the husband has pronounced the 
divorce, which is more or less three months after the divorce (Moosa, 
1998:198). 
33 The Moulana is an Islamic authority in Pretoria, South Africa, whose judgement 
is only binding upon the conscience of Muslims in South Africa. 
34 Sections 2, 3, 11 and 29(2) of the Act. 
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The second argument submitted by W’s counsel was the change in 
the attitude of society towards polygamy. In order to illustrate this 
submission W’s counsel relied on a few factors. First of all they 
argued that the provisions of sections 3(1) and 11 of the Marriage 
Act afforded Islamic marriages some form of recognition. Section 
3(1) reads: 
The Minister and any officer in the public service authorized 
thereto by him may designate any minister of religion of, or any 
person holding a responsible position in, any religious 
denomination or organization to be, so long as he is such a 
minister or occupies such position, a marriage officer for the 
purpose of solemnizing marriages according to Christian, Jewish 
or Mohammedan rites or the rites of any Indian religion. 
The court was of the opinion, however, that section 3(1) did not 
afford any recognition to Islamic marriages. It found that the 
emphasised words related to the form of the marriage ceremony and 
not to the requirements of the marriage as such. Section 3(1) 
enables Muslims to conclude their marriages according to Islamic 
rites by an Imam. If, however, they want their marriages to be valid 
monogamous marriages in terms of South African law, the Imam 
must be a designated marriage officer who has to comply with the 
formalities applicable to the solemnisation of marriages in terms of 
the Act. 
Furthermore, W’s counsel argued that section 11 gave some form of 
recognition to Islamic marriages, because such marriages do not 
“purport to effect a valid marriage” in terms of subsection 3. Section 
11 reads as follows: 
(a) A marriage may be solemnized by a marriage officer only. 
(b) Any marriage officer who purports to solemnize a marriage 
which he is not authorized under this Act to solemnize or 
which to his knowledge is legally prohibited, and any 
person not being a marriage officer who purports to 
solemnize a marriage, shall be guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding four hundred 
rand or, in default of payment, to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding twelve months, or to both such fine 
and such imprisonment. 
(c) Nothing in sub-section (2) contained shall apply to any 
marriage ceremony solemnized in accordance with the 
rites or formularies of any religion, if such ceremony does 
not purport to effect a valid marriage. 
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The court evaluated section 11 and found that there was nothing in 
the provisions of section 11 that gives some form of recognition to 
Islamic marriages. It held: 
The mere fact that the Legislature has not prohibited polygamous 
unions, recognised as marriages under the tenets of the Muslim 
faith, does not mean it also approves of such unions or that the 
consequences thereof are legally enforceable (at 1021H-1022A). 
In the third place W’s counsel referred the court to English and 
Zimbabwean cases to illustrate that increased recognition was given 
to polygamous marriages in England and Zimbabwe. The court held, 
however, that those cases referred to foreign polygamous marriages 
and were, therefore, distinguishable from the facts of this case (at 
1022B-1023H). 
Fourthly, W’s counsel argued that the legislature, in a number of 
statutes, gave recognition to polygamous marriages. The court 
evaluated these statutes and came to the conclusion that the 
existence of such legislation was not indicative of recognition (or 
“tolerance” as the court called it) of Islamic marriages in general (at 
1024C-D). 
The court finally came to the conclusion that the marriage of W and 
H was contra bonos mores and thus void on the following grounds 
(at 1024D-1026B): 
• There was no justification to deviate from the long line of 
decisions in which the courts had refused to give recognition to 
Islamic marriages. 
• The concept of polygamous marriages would undermine the 
monogamous status of civil marriages. 
• The marriage laws of South Africa were designed for mono-
gamous marriages and recognition of polygamous marriages 
would create practical problems.35 
                                           
35 The concept of polygamous marriages is not unfamiliar to the South African law 
system. Discretionary recognition has been given to polygamous customary law 
unions in terms of section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 
1988. Furthermore, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
gives formal recognition to polygamous customary law unions. 
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• The recognition of Islamic marriages would be in conflict with the 
principle of equality between marriage partners.36 
• Muslims had the right to convert their de facto monogamous 
marriages into de jure monogamous marriages in terms of the 
provisions of the Marriage Act. 
• Islamic marriages were “contrary to the accepted customs and 
usages that were regarded as morally binding upon all members 
of society” (at 1026B). 
As a result of the marriage of H and W being void, all Islamic 
customs and the contract arising from their marriage were also 
contra bonos mores and void. The court held accordingly that the 
appeal regarding W’s claim for arrear maintenance, deferred dowry 
and maintenance for the period of Iddat should fail. The claim for 
certain jewellery, which was the property of W, did not rely on the 
same grounds as the other claims and had to succeed (At 1026-
1027). 
The consequences of the non-recognition of Islamic marriages have 
been particularly unfair to Muslim women. Until 2002 she had no 
claim for loss of support if her husband was unlawfully killed37. Even 
today she cannot claim maintenance from her husband after a 
divorce38; is not an intestate beneficiary after the death of her 
husband in terms of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 198739; can 
be compelled to give evidence against her husband in criminal 
                                           
36 For example, a Muslim wife does not participate in the marriage ceremony and a 
Muslim husband may terminate the marriage unilaterally, whilst a Muslim wife is 
not in the position to do so (1024G-H). Although this might be true, the non-
recognition of the marriage in casu also resulted in the prejudice of a wife in that 
she could not claim for maintenance. 
37 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D). 
Fortunately the supreme court of appeal developed the common law claim for 
loss of support to include the claim of a Muslim widow involved in a de facto 
monogamous Islamic marriage. See Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident 
Fund (Commissioner for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA). 
38 Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
39 In terms of the Act, the “spouse” of a deceased person inherits from the 
deceased’s intestate estate if the latter dies intestate. “Spouse” includes only a 
spouse to whom the deceased was married in terms of civil law, and spouses of 
Islamic marriages are not regarded as spouses in terms of the Act. Seedat’s 
Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; Davids v The Master 1983 1 458 
(C). 
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proceedings40 and can not claim financial support during the course 
of her marriage (Cachalia, 1991:22). The question may be asked 
whether the provisions of the 1996 Constitution altered the position 
regarding the recognition of Islamic marriages. A discussion of the 
relevant provisions of the 1996 Constitution follows hereafter. 
4. Islamic marriages and the South African Constitution 
4.1 Introduction 
As already explained, religious communities in South Africa follow 
religious practices that are, at this stage, not formally recognised in 
terms of South African law. The result is that adherents of religious 
legal systems live under state law in the public sphere, which is the 
common law and, with regard to their private life, according to non-
state law, which is religious customs and usages. It is important to 
determine the applicability of the 1996 Constitution, and in particular, 
the Bill of Rights to unrecognised religious legal systems, which are 
unofficially in operation in South Africa. The answer to this issue is 
of importance to Muslim women adhering to Islamic personal law. 
Can they rely on the provisions of the 1996 Constitution for 
protection?  
The issue of the applicability of the Bill of Rights is closely con-
nected to the meaning of “law” within certain sections of the 1996 
Constitution (see section 2 & 8(1)). Section 2 invalidate any “law or 
conduct” that is inconsistent with the Constitution and section 8(1) 
subjects “all law” to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The meaning 
of law has been narrowed down to include only common law, 
customary law and statutory law (Rautenbach, 2000: 303-304). The 
implication is that unrecognised religious legal systems seem to be 
excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights41. 
It is therefore recommended that recognition must be given to 
Islamic personal law, or at least to Islamic marriages. There are at 
least two possible ways to recognise Islamic marriages. The first is 
to develop common law to recognize Islamic marriages, and the 
                                           
40 In terms of section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, a wife or 
husband may not be compelled to testify against each other in a criminal case. 
A Muslim wife or husband is, however, not entitled to invoke such privilege. See 
S v Johardien 1990 1 SA 1026 (C). 
41 See Rautenbach (2002:116-118) for a detailed discussion of her arguments in 
favour of the inclusion of religious legal systems in the definition of “law”. 
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second is to give legislative recognition to Islamic marriages in terms 
of section 15(3) of the 1996 Constitution. These two possibilities will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
4.2 Development of common law 
The first option is to develop the common law in order to recognise 
Islamic marriages. The 1996 Constitution empowers courts to 
develop common law. Such development must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The indirect horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights implies that the common law must be 
developed through the principle of the boni mores. Up to now courts 
have held that Islamic marriages are potentially polygamous and are 
therefore contra bonos mores. Today, however, various sections in 
the 1996 Constitution guarantee religious freedom. Since the “spirit, 
purport, and objects” of the Bill of Rights must be promoted when 
common law is interpreted, it may be argued that the non-
recognition of Islamic marriages is unconstitutional in the light of our 
constitutional values of equality and freedom. According to Corbett 
et al. (1980:67)  
... the policy decisions of our courts which shape and, at times, 
refashion the common law must also reflect the wishes, often 
unspoken, and the perceptions, often but dimly discerned, of the 
people. 
Through the years there have been attempts to develop common 
law to give recognition to Islamic practices or customs followed in 
South Africa. Ryland v Edros 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C) and Amod v 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D) 
serve as recent illustrations of these attempts. In Ryland v Edros42, 
the court was prepared to develop common law to give recognition 
to the contractual consequences of an Islamic marriage. The facts of 
the case were as follows: H and W entered into a de facto 
monogamous Islamic marriage in 1976. Their marriage did not 
comply with the provisions of the Marriage Act and was, therefore, 
not a valid recognised marriage in terms of the said Act. H divorced 
W in 1992 by serving the talaaqi on her. Thereafter he instituted an 
action in court to evict her from the house that they shared as 
husband and wife. W defended the action and instituted a counter-
                                           
42 The case was decided when the 1993 Constitution was still in force. However, 
section 14 of the 1993 Constitution is similar to section 15 of the 1996 
Constitution, and the decision is still relevant to the interpretation of the 1996 
Constitution. 
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claim for arrear maintenance (for the period of their marriage), a 
consolatory gift43 and an equitable portion of the growth of H’s 
estate44. She based her claim on the “contractual agreement” 
constituted by their Islamic marriage. During the pre-trial 
proceedings H and W agreed that W would vacate the house and 
that H would pay half of W’s costs with regard to her counter-claim. 
The only issue on which the court had to decide was W’s counter-
claim.  
In order to reach a decision regarding W’s counter-claim, the court 
had to answer two preliminary questions. The first question was 
whether it was appropriate for the court to pronounce upon religious 
matters45. Farlam J pointed out that courts, in the past, did not 
involve themselves in religious matters “unless some proprietary or 
other legally recognised right was involved.”46 He argued that 
section 14 of the 1993 Constitution47 might have changed the 
position and that the doctrine of entanglement might now be part of 
South African law. However, since the representatives of H and W 
agreed that the present issues did not require the interpretation of 
religious issues, there was no question of doctrinal entanglement. It 
was, therefore, not necessary for the court to deal with the 
question.48 
The second question was whether the Ismail case prevented H and 
W from relying on the marriage contract that formed the basis of 
their Islamic marriage. Farlam J held that public policy was a 
question of fact.49 Because public policy is based on facts, it can 
                                           
43 W alleged that the divorce was without just cause. 696G. 
44 W alleged that she contributed labour, effort and money to H’s estate and that 
she is therefore entitled to an equitable portion thereof. 696H. 
45 Farlam J Refers to it as the “doctrine of entanglement.” 
46 703E. Quoted from Allen v Gibbs 1977 3 SA 212 (SE) 218A-B. 
47 The wording of section 13 of the 1993 Constitution is similar to the wording of 
section 15 of the 1996 Constitution. 
48 703B-J. It may, however, be argued that the court did indeed interpret religious 
issues by choosing the evidence of one expert witness over the other on the 
issue of the division of property between the parties (715-714). 
49 At 704B. He referred to the 1993 Constitution, which was the beginning of the 
new South African constitutional dispensation. According to Mahomed 
(1997:189) it is clear that the concept of public policy is not a vague and 
arbitrary concept that is “ … open to abuse by an executive-minded judiciary. 
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only change if there is a change in the facts on which it is based. He 
accepted that the 1993 Constitution brought about a change in the 
factual position of public policy in South African common law and it 
was possible to revise the Ismail case regarding the validity of a 
contract flowing from an Islamic marriage. The 1993 Constitution 
required a reappraisal of the basic values on which public policy was 
based. If the “spirit, purport and objects” of the 1993 Constitution 
and the basic values underlying it were in conflict with the view 
regarding public policy, as expressed in the Ismail case, then the 
values underlying the 1993 Constitution had to prevail. 
The court then considered whether the underlying values of the 
1993 Constitution were in conflict with the views regarding public 
policy as expressed in the Ismail case. Farlam J came to the 
conclusion that it could not be said that the contract arising from a 
Islamic marriage was “contrary to the accepted customs and usages 
which are regarded as morally binding upon all members of our 
society” or was “fundamentally opposed to our principles and 
institutions” as expressed in the Ismail case. He based his decision 
on, inter alia, the fact that the viewpoints of only one group in our 
multicultural society were taken into consideration and found: 
[I]t is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one 
group to impose its values on another and that the Courts should 
only brand a contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive 
to those values which are shared by the community at large, by all 
right-thinking people in the community and not only by one section 
of it (707G). 
Secondly, Farlam J referred to the principles of equality and of 
diversity and the recognition of the South African society as a 
multicultural society. These principles were among the values that 
underlined the 1993 Constitution. In his opinion these values 
“irradiate” the concept of public policy that the courts have to apply. 
He differed from the viewpoint expressed in the Ismail case, that is 
that the contracts in issue were contra bonos mores and held:  
In my opinion the ‘radiating’ effect of the values underlying the new 
Constitution50 is such that neither of these grounds for holding the 
contractual terms under consideration in this case to be unlawful 
can be supported (at 709C). 
                                                                                                                           
Rather it operates within definite parameters and is guided by the interpretation 
provision …” of the 1993 Constitution. 
50 The 1993 Constitution. 
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Finally he came to the conclusion that the marriage, as well as the 
contract arising from the marriage, were not contra bonos mores. 
The result was that the Ismail case no longer “operates to preclude 
a court from enforcing claims such as those brought by” parties to 
an Islamic union. The court then proceeded to consider the counter-
claim of W and awarded her arrear maintenance after considering 
the facts.51 The question of whether W was entitled to a consolatory 
gift stood over for later determination.52 Regarding the claim for an 
equitable share in H’s estate, the court found that W could not prove 
that such a custom existed among the Muslim population and that 
her claim had to fail.53 
Although this case is seen as a landmark case regarding the rights 
of Muslims in South Africa, its effect is limited in three ways. Firstly, 
no recognition has been given to Islamic marriages. It is only the 
marriage contract that arises from a Islamic marriage that is 
                                           
51 At 711D-714F. W claimed arrear maintenance from January 1977 (date of 
marriage) to 14 January 1993 (third month after third talak was served). The 
court pointed out that the parties concluded a contract in terms of which they 
agreed that their marriage would be governed by Islamic law. It was common 
cause that the rules of the Shafi’i school is relevant in this case. Under the 
Shafi’i school H is obliged to maintain his wife during their marriage and for a 
period of three months after talaaqi. It is, therefore, clear that H and W agreed 
(in terms of their marriage contract) that H would maintain W during their 
marriage and for three months after talaaqi, and that any unpaid maintenance 
would accumulate as a debt and that the prescription of such a debt would not 
be possible. The court held, however, that prescription is for the benefit of the 
general public and that an agreement to renounce prescription (as in this case) 
would be against public policy. Therefore, H is only liable to pay maintenance to 
W for the period from 25 October 1991 (i.e. three years before W’s counter-
claim was served on H’s attorneys) to 14 January 1993 (i.e. three months after 
the marriage was terminated by the third talak). 
52 At 714G-H. H and W had to lead evidence regarding H’s conduct regarding the 
divorce before the issue could be decided. 
53 W’s counsel argued that W was entitled to an equitable portion of H’s estate. He 
based his argument on legislation enacted in Malaysia, that is section 58 of the 
Malaysian Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 that confers upon a 
court the power to order a division of assets between divorcing parties (715D-
717A). The court did not accept his argument and held: “It is clear, in my view, 
that the Malaysian rules are based, in part at least, on Malay custom which, not 
being in conflict with the essential principles of Islamic law, is capable of being 
synthesised therewith. In view of the fact that no other Islamic country … adopts 
this approach, I cannot see on what basis I can regard the Malaysian rules as 
being part of the provisions of Islamic personal law incorporated by the parties 
into their contract unless a custom similar to the Malay adat relating to harta 
sepencarian prevails among the Islamic community to which the parties belong 
in the Western Cape” (717B-D). 
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recognised as valid. Secondly, the court did not deal with 
polygamous Islamic marriages and it is uncertain whether the court 
would have followed the same route if the marriage was in fact 
polygamous. Thirdly, it was a decision of the Cape Provincial 
Division and the possibility exists that other provinces might follow a 
different route because of the rule of stare decisis. 
This was what in fact happened in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle 
Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D), which was a decision of the 
Durban high court. The facts of the case were as follows: H and W 
entered into an Islamic marriage in 1989. Their marriage did not 
comply with the requirements of the Marriage Act and was, 
therefore, not regarded as a valid civil marriage. H was killed in a 
motor accident in 1993 and W lodged a claim for compensation 
against the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (MMF) for loss 
of support by reason of H’s death. The MMF denied liability due to 
the fact that the marriage between H and W was a void Islamic 
marriage. W contended that H had a contractual obligation to 
support her.54  
The question before the court was whether the MMF was legally 
liable to compensate W for her loss of support. In terms of South 
African common law, such a liability would exist if H were, during his 
life, under a common law duty to support W. In terms of section 31 
of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 a partner in a 
customary marriage may also claim for loss of support as a result of 
the death of the breadwinner. However, due to the Ismail case, 
which held that Islamic marriages were contra bonos mores, such a 
duty did not exist if the parties had been married in terms of Islamic 
law. 
W’s counsel argued, first of all, that there had been a change in 
public policy regarding the conclusion of Islamic marriages that had 
changed the traditional position. Meskin J found, however, that the 
onus to prove such a change rested on W and that she could not 
prove that there had been a change of policy since the Ismail case.  
Secondly, W’s counsel argued that the court should develop the 
common law to recognise a duty to support arising out of an Islamic 
marriage (section 39(2) read with sections 8(2) and (3) of the 1996 
Constitution). Meskin J held that, although the facts of the case 
                                           
54 In terms of an Islamic marriage, which is a contract, H is obliged to support and 
maintain W. 
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occurred before the commencement of the 1996 Constitution, it was 
in the interest of justice to apply the 1996 Constitution to the facts of 
the case. He interpreted sections 39(2), 8(2) and 8(3) of the 1996 
Constitution and came to the conclusion that section 39(2) does not 
allow courts the general power to develop common law “to promote 
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights”. The court argues 
that if section 39(2) is read with sections 8(2) and (3), it is clear that 
the development of the common law the legislature had in mind is 
development  
… in order to give effect to a right in the Bill … to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right … It is not intended that 
the Court is to have a general power of development of the 
common law to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights’ independently of giving effect, when applying a provision of 
the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person, to ‘a right in the Bill 
… to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right’55.  
W’s counsel argued that that the right to equality (section 9 of the 
1996 Constitution) that includes the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against on the grounds of marital status or religion, 
and the right to dignity (section 10 of the 1996 Constitution) are 
relevant to the facts of the case. Taking the facts of the case into 
consideration, Meskin J agreed that “a refusal to recognise the 
contractual duty of support upon which [W] relies as being sufficient 
to ground the liability which she seeks to enforce constitutes, 
indeed, a violation” of these rights. He agreed that such refusal 
would result in the unequal treatment of persons before the law, that 
is between females lawfully married in terms of the civil law to a 
deceased breadwinner and those married illegally to a deceased 
breadwinner in terms of non-recognised Islamic law. Although such 
refusal could result in the unequal treatment before the law, the 
question is whether the court has the power to develop common law 
by the elimination of a principle that already forms part of it. With 
reference to Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC)56 Meskin 
J held: 
                                           
55
 Section 8(3)(a). 1722H-J. In Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 4 
BCLR 444 (T) Roux J held that the time has arrived for the recognition of a 
reciprocal duty of support owed by parties to a same-sex union. Such 
recognition is in accordance with the court’s duty to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing common law (448H-J). 
56 1723 H-I. 
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As I read section 8(3)(a), the intention is that if there is silence in 
the common law with regard to the giving effect to a right in the 
Bill, and legislation does not give effect to such right, the court 
must amplify the common law to eliminate such silence. This is not 
an intention that the court must, in order to give effect to a 
particular right, eliminate or alter an existing principle of the 
common law which affects the operation of such right, irrespective 
of the manner in which this occurs. The intention is that such 
alteration or elimination is to remain the function of the legislature 
(own emphasis – CR). 
The court finally came to the conclusion that it may not alter the 
existing law regarding a claim for loss of support to include a duty to 
support in terms of a contractual relationship resulting from an 
Islamic marriage and W’s claim was denied.57  
It is clear from the judgement that the court read its power to 
develop the common law as restrictive, i.e. not to eliminate 
principles that already form part of it. Such an attitude creates the 
impression that the courts, that are supposed to be the protectors of 
fundamental rights, are powerless to enforce or to protect those 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights. The 1996 Constitution provides 
the opportunity to adapt common law to give recognition to Islamic 
marriages. This developmental function of the courts should not be 
read as restrictive, i.e. to eliminate common law, but to adapt it to 
new circumstances. The distinctive character of common law has 
always been its ability to change through the ages. However, if it is 
not kept in mind that the change will not always be acceptable to the 
community, it will be mere paper law. This may also be one of the 
reasons why courts are reluctant to interfere with de facto situations 
and why they leave it to the legislature to effect change. Courts may, 
however, not ignore their duty as protector of an individual’s 
fundamental rights in terms of the 1996 Constitution, by leaving it to 
the legislature to effect change. 
Another disappointing aspect of the decision is the court’s approach 
regarding an individual’s constitutional right to equality. Surely the 
unequal treatment of married Muslim and other couples cannot be 
proven to be fair as envisaged in terms of section 9(5)?  
                                           
57 The court distinguished the issues of this case from the issues present in Ryland 
v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) and correctly held on 1726E that the court in Ryland 
v Edros 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C) did not hold that a Islamic marriage is a lawful 
marriage or that it generated a legal duty to support a wife. 
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After the decision in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident 
Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D) had been delivered, W applied for 
leave to appeal directly to the constitutional court.58 The constitut-
ional court found that the crucial question in the application before 
the court was whether the common law should be developed to 
allow the applicant to claim damages for support. Since it was the 
viewpoint of the constitutional court that this question is one which 
falls primarily within the jurisdiction of the supreme court of appeal, 
the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. Although it could 
not be said that the constitutional court was misdirected in its 
findings, the reluctance (or caution) of courts to apply the Bill of 
Rights directly to private relationships is illustrated.  
The facts of the case were then considered by the supreme court of 
appeal in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 
(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 
(SCA). (For a discussion of the issues raised in the case see 
Rautenbach & Du Plessis, 2000:302-314.) On behalf of the 
appellant and the Commission for Gender Equality, it was argued 
that common law rules make provision for a claim for loss of support 
of a Muslim widow. In the alternative, it was argued that if the rules 
of common law do not make such provision, common law should be 
developed in terms of section 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution.59  
The MMF alleged that an Islamic marriage does not enjoy the same 
status as a civil marriage, that the duty to support was a “contractual 
consequence of the union between them and not an ex lege 
consequence of the marriage per se” and that the action for loss of 
support should not be extended to include claims for loss of support 
pursuant to a contractual duty to furnish support. The action for loss 
of support, it was argued, should be restricted to cases in which the 
duty of support is one of the common law consequences of a valid 
marriage. 
The court found that the appellant had a good cause of action, 
based on the fact that the deceased had a legally enforceable duty 
to support the appellant. The duty arose from a solemn marriage in 
accordance with the tenets of a recognised and accepted faith and 
that it was a duty that deserved protection and recognition for the 
                                           
58 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 4 SA 753 (CC). 
59 See par [5]. The 1993 Constitution was in effect when the action commenced in 
the court a quo. 
Islamic marriages in Sourh Africa: Quo vadimus?  
144 Koers 69(1) 2003:121-152 
purposes of the dependant’s action. The question was not whether 
the marriage was lawful at common law, but whether the deceased 
had a duty to support the appellant during the subsistence of the 
marriage. The court based its findings on an “important shift in the 
identifiable boni mores of the community” that “must also manifest 
itself in a corresponding evolution in the relevant parameters of 
application in this area,” (at Par [23]) and on the test laid down in 
Santam Bpk v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA). The court stated the 
following with regard to the non-recognition of an action for loss of 
support in the case of a monogamous Islamic marriage: 
It is inconsistent with the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and 
religious freedom which had consolidated itself in the community 
even before the formal adoption of the interim Constitution on 22 
December 1993 (at Par [20]). ... 
The inequality, arbitrariness, intolerance and inequity inherent in 
such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the new ethos which 
prevailed on 25 July 1993 when the cause of action in the present 
matter commenced (at Par [23] – CJR).  
The court did not find it necessary to discuss the application of 
section 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution or section 39(2) of the 1996 
Constitution, as it was able to reach its conclusion without reliance 
on those provisions. 
The effect of this case is limited in two ways. Firstly, no recognition 
has been given to Islamic marriages. It is only the claim of a 
surviving spouse (married in terms of common law) for loss of 
support that has been extended to spouses married in terms of 
unrecognised Islamic personal law. Secondly, the court did not deal 
with polygamous Islamic marriages and it is uncertain whether 
spouses involved in such marriages would receive similar protection. 
It is, therefore, suggested that legislative recognition of Islamic 
marriages be given.  
4.3 Legislative recognition of Islamic marriages 
In the previous paragraphs it was illustrated that courts are reluctant 
to develop common law to recognise Islamic marriages. Further-
more, the Bill of Right’s scope of application to common law is 
uncertain.60 A second option is to allow for the legislative recognition 
of Islamic personal law. 
                                           
60 With regard to the application of the Bill of Rights to common law, it is argued 
that section 8 of the 1996 Constitution does not necessarily support the direct 
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Unofficial religious legal systems or, at least, marriages concluded 
under a “system of religious, personal or family law” in South Africa 
must receive legislative recognition in terms of the 1996 Con-
stitution.61 Such recognition would ensure that the Bill of Rights 
applies to customs and usages followed by religious communities 
and that the necessary constitutional protection is afforded to 
women within these communities. There are already numerous Acts 
in South Africa that recognise certain aspects of Islamic marriages, 
for example: 
• Section 21(3) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 describes the 
word “spouse” to include also a wife or husband married 
“according to any law or custom”. 
• Section 31 of the Special Pensions Act 69 of 1996 defines 
“dependant” to include the spouse of a deceased to whom he or 
she was married “under any Asian religion”. 
• Section 1 of the Demobilisation Act 99 of 1996 defines 
“dependant” to include the surviving spouse to whom the 
deceased was married “in accordance with the tenets of a 
religion”. 
• Section 1(2)(a) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 
1992 includes in the word “marriage” all marriages contracted 
according to the “tenets of any religion”. 
Although it may be argued that this legislation recognises Islamic 
marriages for practical reasons, it is indicative of the plurality of the 
South African society. It is difficult to justify why Islamic marriages 
are recognised for certain purposes, but not when the parties of an 
Islamic marriage turn to the courts for the recognition of their union. 
Another reason why religious legal systems should be recognised 
concerns the developmental function of courts. Courts have the 
                                                                                                                           
application of the Bill of Rights to private disputes in terms of common law. It is 
argued that various provisions of the 1996 Constitution support the indirect 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to common law. For a discussion of 
the arguments in favour of such an inference, see Rautenbach (2001:303 et 
seq). 
61 Section 15(3) reads: “(a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising – 
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or 
family law; or (ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or 
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. (b) Recognition in terms 
of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of 
the Constitution.” 
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power to develop common law and customary law. They do not 
have similar powers regarding unrecognised religious legal systems. 
It would, therefore, be difficult, if not impossible, for courts to adapt 
any customs and usages adhered to as unofficial law in South 
Africa. Even if courts had the power to develop the legal rules of the 
religious communities, it is doubtful whether these communities 
would tolerate judicial interference with their customs and usages 
(Rautenbach, 2002:118). 
The recognition of Islamic personal law or Muslim marriages must 
be consistent with the Bill of Rights contained in the 1996 
Constitution. The implication is that Islamic personal law will only be 
recognised to the extent that it conforms to the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. The drafting of legislation that 
recognises Islamic personal law or at least Islamic marriages will not 
be an easy task. There are numerous areas of potential conflict. 
From a Western point of view, Islamic personal law often 
discriminates against women.62 For example, a women inherits only 
half of what her male counterpart inherits (see Cachalia, 1991:30); it 
is easier for a husband to divorce his wife than for a wife to divorce 
her husband63; a wife does not participate in the marriage ceremony 
and a husband may marry more than one wife whilst a wife may only 
marry one husband64. If all “discrimination” is not eliminated, the 
recognition of Islamic personal law by means of legislation will not 
be in compliance with the provisions of the 1996 Constitution.  
4.4 Draft Bill on Islamic Marriages 
The South African Law Commission (SALC) has been involved in 
the investigation of Islamic personal law since 1990 (Project 59). 
The first project committee that was appointed did not make much 
progress with the investigation. The reasons for the delay are not 
very clear. It seems as if the finalisation of the 1996 Constitution and 
a divergence of opinion on contentious issues are some of the 
                                           
62 Discrimination against women is by no means typical of religiously based 
personal law systems. South African common law was, until recently, also guilty 
of discrimination against women. However, the most blatant forms of 
discrimination were removed by the legislature. For example, in 1993, the 
General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 abolished the marital power of 
a husband over his wife and the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 
provides for the prosecution of marital rape for the first time. 
63 Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A) 1024 G. 
64 Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A) 1024 G. 
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reasons that could be advanced. The SALC did not publish any of its 
findings for discussion. 
In 1996, the SALC showed renewed interest in the investigation. It 
decided to accord the investigation a high priority rating and 
recommended the appointment of a project committee. During 
March 1997 the SALC held two workshops in order to involve 
members of the public and interested parties. From 78 nominations 
received, the previous Minister of Justice appointed a new project 
committee who, under the leadership of Justice Navsa, issued its 
first discussion document at the end of May 2000 – Issue Paper 
1565. According to the SALC, its aim is to “investigate the legal 
recognition of Islamic Marriages and other aspects of Islamic 
Personal Law”. As a result of Issue Paper 15, various responses 
from interested parties were received and considered by the SALC. 
The comments were published at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/ 
issue/issue.html.  
At the end of 2001 the SALC published Discussion Paper 101 
(SALC Discussion Paper 101, 2001). The closing date for comments 
was 31 January 2002. The discussion document contains a 
proposed Draft Bill on Islamic Marriages. The purpose of the draft 
Bill is to recognise existing monogamous and polygamous Islamic 
marriages.66 The Draft Bill makes provision for, inter alia, the 
recognition of Islamic marriages in South Africa (clause 4), the 
requirements for a valid Islamic marriage67, the registration68, 
proprietary consequences69 and dissolution70 of Islamic marriages 
                                           
65 SALC Issue Paper 15 (2000). The closing date for comments was the end of 
July 2000. 
66 In terms of clause 1 of the draft Bill “Islamic marriage” means a marriage 
“contracted in accordance with Islamic law only”. It excludes a civil marriage 
concluded in terms of the Marriage Act. The parties may, however, elect to 
cause the provisions of the draft Bill to apply to the civil marriage. 
67 Clause 5 deals in essence with the minimum age of marriage which is eighteen 
years of age, and the issue of consent by the parties. 
68 Clause 6 makes provision for the recognition of existing and new Islamic 
marriages. However, the failure to register an Islamic marriage does not affect 
the validity of a marriage. 
69 The proprietary consequences of a marriage are dealt with in clause 8. A 
marriage is automatically out of community of property, except if the spouses 
entered into a contractual arrangement in terms of which they mutually agree to 
another marriage regime. 
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and the status and capacity of spouses in Islamic marriages (clause 
3). Custody and access to children are based on the principle of the 
best interest of the child and are dealt with in clause 11. Clause 14 
has specifically been inserted to deal with the situation where the 
parties were married in terms of civil and Islamic law. An Islamic 
marriage must be dissolved prior to the dissolution of a civil 
marriage. This is to avoid the hardships caused by the dissolution of 
a civil marriage whilst an Islamic marriage still exists. In terms of 
clause 12, the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 apply to Islamic 
marriages. 
All responses received up to and including 10 April 2000 were 
published by the SALC in a special document referred to as 
“Collation of Submissions on Discussion Paper 101: Islamic and 
Related Matters”.71 The general viewpoint is that the Draft Bill will 
alleviate the hardships that existed as a result of the non-recognition 
of Islamic marriages. However, concerns exist regarding the non-
support of the Draft Bill among some groupings of the Muslim 
community. Up to date no legislation has been published in this 
regard. 
Although the SALC is currently investigating the recognition of 
Islamic marriages only, the possibility is not excluded that other 
religious communities will soon follow. 
5. Concluding remarks  
Islamic marriages and Islamic personal law are not recognised in 
terms of South African common law. The 1996 Constitution gives 
courts the opportunity to adapt common law to “promote the spirit, 
purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights” (Section 39(2)). The 
development function of courts should not be read as restrictive, that 
is to eliminate common law, but to adapt it to new circumstances. 
The distinctive character of common law has always been its ability 
to adapt to changing circumstances.  
The 1996 Constitution recognises, among other rights, the cultural 
diversity of South Africa by protecting cultural and religious rights. 
Such change in public policy regarding the recognition of cultural 
                                                                                                                           
70 Clause 9 recognises the dissolution of a marriage on any ground permitted by 
Islamic law. Provision is made to register an irrevocable talaq that must be 
confirmed by a court in order to be effective. 
71 Available at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/discussn/collationdp101.doc. 
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diversity in South Africa should be reflected in the decisions of 
courts. Courts should not ignore their newly-found duty as protector 
of an individual’s fundamental rights by leaving it to the legislature to 
effect change. Undoubtedly courts are placed in a difficult position. If 
they develop common law to recognise Islamic marriages as valid 
marriages, it may lead to discrimination against women. On the 
other hand, if they do not recognise Islamic marriages as valid 
marriages, they do not afford equal legal protection to Muslims. 
The 1996 Constitution makes provision for the recognition of 
traditional and religious marriages and traditional and religious 
personal law systems by means of legislation. In order to reach legal 
certainty regarding the validity of Islamic marriages, legislative 
recognition should be given to legalise Islamic marriages in South 
Africa. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (120 of 1998) 
serves as an example of such an act.  
The new dispensation brought about by the 1996 Constitution has 
introduced a particular perspective regarding the recognition of 
Islamic marriages. A pluralistic society such as South Africa would 
pose an enormous challenge to ensure vis-à-vis the constitutional 
court that the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights are to be 
enforced, and apply to all citizens. On the other hand, the seemingly 
discriminatory laws are based on values that are not subject to 
censure on any ground whatsoever. It is important that Muslim 
women participate in the SALC’s investigation into Islamic marriages 
in order to ensure that their rights are in no way compromised in 
favour of religious and cultural freedoms and rights.  
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